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Beyond the Ontological Difference: 
Heidegger, Binswanger, and 
the Future of Existential Analysis 
Anthony Vincent Fernandez 
The "ontological difference"-that is, the difference between being and 
beings-is a central theme in Martin Heidegger's philosophy. The proper 
interpretation of this difference is, however, contentious. One of the most 
famous misinterpretations is found in the work of Ludwig Binswanger, the 
founder of existential analysis-a fusion of psychoanalysis and phenomenol­
ogy. Binswanger adapted Heidegger's philosophy of human existence for his 
own studies of mental disorder and, in the course of this adaptation, critiqued 
Heidegger's philosophy. Heidegger, initially supportive of Binswanger's 
application, later accused him of grossly misunderstanding the ontological 
difference. According to Heidegger, Binswanger's studies of particular psy­
chopathological cases should be taken as ontic (i.e., as a study of concrete 
beings-in this case, the concrete human being) rather than as ontological 
(i.e., as a study of the meaning of being-in this case, what it means to be 
human). Binswanger readily admitted his error but claimed that it was, in the 
end, a "productive misunderstanding"-a characterization that did little to 
satisfy Heidegger. 
In many tellings, this is where the story ends: Binswanger initially mis­
understood Heidegger's ontological difference but later admitted his error, 
corrected his interpretation, and properly characterized the nature of his own 
psychiatric project. This story, however, presents the disagreement as a quib­
ble between two thinkers. It neglects the broader influence of Binswanger's 
misinterpretation-specifically, how this misinterpretation produced the 
philosophical foundations of phenomenological psychopathology, or the 
phenomenological study of mental disorders. 
In this chapter, I revisit this dispute and explain how Binswanger inspired 
the philosophical foundations of phenomenological psychopathology. In fol­
lowing this thread, I do not deny that Binswanger misunderstood Heidegger's 
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ontological difference. I suggest, instead, that Binswanger's misunderstand­
ing of Heidegger points us toward the correct understanding of human 
existence. However, to achieve this new understanding, we will have to 
clarify the nature of the ontological difference and resolve the ambiguities in 
Binswanger's approach. 
This chapter proceeds in four parts: First, I provide an interpretation of the 
ontological difference, laying the foundation for subsequent sections. Sec­
ond, I use this interpretation to justify Heidegger's critique, and to highlight 
the ambiguities in Binswanger's approach. Third, I show how Binswanger's 
application ofHeideggerian phenomenology, despite his misunderstanding of 
the ontological difference, inspired Michel Foucault's and Maurice Merleau­
Ponty's approaches to psychopathology.1 Fourth, I develop a new account of 
what it means to overcome the ontological difference, and I argue that this 
manner of overcoming the difference provides the metaphysical foundations 
that phenomenological psychopathologists require. 
THE ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE 
What is the ontological difference? The nature of this difference is not 
entirely clear in Heidegger's own work and, as a result, has been interpreted 
in a variety of ways. Before articulating the nature of Heidegger's critique, 
and Binswanger's apparent error, it will be helpful to make my own interpre­
tation of the ontological difference explicit. 
Ontology is the study of being, or of what it means for something to be 
what it is. Heidegger contrasts ontology with ontic investigations, which are 
studies of particular beings, rather than their being. For instance, I might con­
sider my coffee mug ontically: It's white, made of ceramic, four inches high, 
holds eight ounces of liquid, and so on. These are ontic facts about my coffee 
mug. But, if I wanted to get philosophical (or ontological), I could ask what 
it means to be a coffee mug: What makes a coffee mug what it is? Which 
features or qualities must something have in order to be considered a coffee 
mug at all? Is a coffee mug with a hole in the bottom still a coffee mug? Is 
a painting of a coffee mug a coffee mug? What about a sculpture of a coffee 
mug? Rather than asking about ontic facts that pertain to my particular coffee 
mug, or even ontic facts that pertain to all coffee mugs, these questions aim 
at determining the being-or, we might say, the essence-of coffee mugs. 
Of course, Heidegger's concern wasn't to clarify the being of coffee mugs. 
It was to understand the meaning of being in general, or what it means to be at 
all. But, in order to properly ask this question, he first had to answer another: 
What does it mean to be human? According to Heidegger, we need to articu­
late the essence of human existence before we can properly inquire into the 
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meaning of being as such. This is because human beings are the ones who ask 
ontological questions in the first place. Human beings are "pre-ontological," 
because they already have some vague understanding of what it means to be 
(Heidegger 1962, 36-37). For our purposes, we can focus exclusively on this 
ontological question of what it means to be human; how this question differs 
from ontic questions about human beings gets us to the heart ofBinswanger's 
apparent misunderstanding. 
How does Heidegger approach the distinctive ontology of the human 
being? fu Being and Time, he aims to discover and describe the basic "struc­
tures" of human existence. These are "not just any accidental structures, but 
essential ones which, in every kind of Being that factical Dasein may possess, 
persist as determinative for the character of its Being" (Heidegger 1962, 38). 
By "factical Dasein," he refers to a particular human existence, a human being 
with a concrete history, situation, and so on. In other words, Heidegger's goal 
is to discover those structures of human existence that hold across all particu­
lar human beings. And these structures must be "determinative"-they must 
play a central role in what it means to be human. For Heidegger, to be human 
is to be world-disclosive: Human existence is being-in-the-world. 
What, then, are these essential structures? They are what Heidegger calls 
"existentials"-structures that play a role in our existentiality, or transcen­
dence and openness toward the world. For example, the existential that 
Heidegger calls "situatedness" (Befindlichkeit) refers to the fact that we are 
always situated in the world through some mood or affective attunement. 
Perhaps you are situated through a mood of joy, while I am situated through 
a mood of boredom. Neither joy nor boredom is an essential structure, or 
existential, because they are just one way that a particular subject might be 
attuned to the world. But no matter which mood we are attuned through, we 
are always situated and attuned through some mood, so it is the basic struc­
ture of situatedness that is essential (F emandez 2017; Heidegger 1962). 
The particular affective attunement that we are situated in, our mood, is 
what Heidegger calls a "mode" (Heidegger 1962, 179-182). Modes are the 
phenomena that belong to some existential, or category, of human existence.2 
Moods are the modes of affective situatedness, but each existential has its 
own set of modes, such as modes of understanding, modes of spatiality, and 
modes of temporality. In the case of temporality, for instance, I might find 
myself in the temporal mode of eager anticipation, or the temporal mode 
of whiling away the time. But the world is always presented to me through 
some temporal mode, which means that temporality is an essential struc­
ture of human existence-that is, an existential. Each existential therefore 
encompasses a set of phenomena that share the same basic features, and the 
total set of existentials is the structure of human existence in general-what 
Heidegger sometimes calls our "categorial structure" (Heidegger 1962, 37). 
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What does this all have to do with the ontological difference? Existentials 
are, on Heidegger's account, ontological features of human existence; modes, 
in contrast, are ontic features of human existence. To provide a complete 
ontology of what it means to be human, I will need to articulate all of the 
existentials, all of those structures that are essential to and determinative of 
human existence in general. But I won't need to provide an account of any 
particular modes of human existence. Particular modes are accidental, or non­
essential, and are therefore not in the purview of ontology. 
But what if I wanted to understand the experience of a particular individ­
ual, say, a person living with severe depression? According to Heidegger, this 
investigation would be ontic, rather than ontological, because it concerns a 
particular human being-not the structures that hold across all human beings. 
Instead of studying the essential structure of affective situatedness, I might 
investigate the particular mode of affective situatedness that the depressed 
person finds himself in-that is, his depressed mood. This doesn't mean 
that existential, or ontological, features of human existence play no role in 
my ontic investigation. They provide a useful framework for my particular 
inquiry. If I know that all human beings are affectively situated, and have 
some spatial and temporal orientation, then I might decide to study the modes 
of situatedness, spatiality, and temporality in this particular human being. 
Nevertheless, the ontological and ontic approaches to human existence are 
fundamentally different projects, with different aims and subject matter­
even if they can reciprocally guide and inform each other. With this clari­
fication of the ontological difference in hand, we can tum to Binswanger's 
misunderstanding of this difference, and Heidegger's critique. 
BINSWANGER'S MISINTERPRETATION 
Binswanger was one of the first psychiatrists to draw upon twentieth-century 
phenomenology. He found in Heidegger's work a new way of conceiving 
the nature of human existence and, thus, a new way of conceiving the nature 
of disordered or pathological forms of human existence. He developed his 
own phenomenological approach to psychiatric research and practice, which 
he called "existential analysis." Heidegger initially supported Binswanger's 
project, and the two engaged in a long-if not too frequent-correspondence. 
However, Binswanger's work was not merely an application. He also argued 
that there were important aspects of human existence that Heidegger neglected. 
While Heidegger was initially open to these criticisms, he eventually turned 
on Binswanger with a damning criticism of his own: Binswanger's attempt 
to supplement and modify Heidegger's project was based on a fundamental 
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misunderstanding of the nature and aims of Heidegger's work, and especially 
of the ontological difference. 
For the sake of clarity, we can focus on one example that received consid­
erable attention from Heidegger and illustrates Binswanger's general misun­
derstanding. One of the central existentials that Heidegger discusses in Being 
and Time is care (Sorge).3 According to Heidegger, when we take human 
existence in its totality, or as a whole, we find that it is first and foremost care. 
This means that the world, and everything within it, is always given to us as 
meaningful. Even when I say "I don't care," this is a way of caring. What­
ever it is that I don't care about is meaningful to me, or makes sense to me, 
precisely as that which is not worth my time, my consideration, my attention, 
and so on. Furthermore, Heidegger stresses that care should be understood in 
an "ontologico-existential manner" (1962, 237). This means that care, as an 
existential, should be taken as an ontological category that includes an array 
of ontic modes. As Heidegger says, 
Care, as a primordial structural totality, lies "before" ["vor"] every factical "atti­
tude" and "situation" ofDasein, and it does so existentially a priori; this means 
that it always lies in them. So this phenomenon by no means expresses a priority 
of the "practical" attitude over the theoretical. When we ascertain something 
present-at-hand by merely beholding it, this activity has the character of care 
just as much as does a "political action" or taking a rest and enjoying oneself. 
"Theory" and "practice" are possibilities of Being for an entity whose Being 
must be defined as "care." (Heidegger 1962, 238) 
In other words, any particular way of taking one's world or environment as 
meaningful is already grounded in this existential. No matter which attitude 
or concrete situation we might find ourselves in, that situation is always 
meaningfully available to us through care. 
Binswanger was intrigued by Heidegger's notion of care as the human 
being's openness toward a meaningful world. But, he believed that Hei­
degger's notion was incapable of accounting for certain kinds of interpersonal 
relationships because it neglected the importance of love. He argued that 
Heidegger provided an account of how we can be with other human beings, 
mutually directed toward our world, but failed to provide a robust account 
of what Martin Buber called the "I and thou" relation-that is, a relation in 
which we are directed toward the other, rather than directed toward our world 
with the other (Buber 1972). Central to this form of interpersonal directedness 
is love. Binswanger "believed that true psychotherapy was dependent upon 
the emergence of a loving relationship between the patient and therapist-a 
relationship that was always attuned to the affective complexities of interac­
tion" (Frie 1999, 249). 
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As I noted earlier, Heidegger's criticism centered on Binswanger's appar­
ent misunderstanding of the ontological difference.4 But what does love have 
to do with the ontological difference? Heidegger explained his concern with 
Binswanger's work when he lectured to a group of Swiss psychiatrists at the 
home of Medard Boss.5 In these lectures, Heidegger disparaged Binswanger's 
existential analysis: 
Binswanger's misunderstanding consists not so much of the fact that he wants 
to supplement "care" with love, but that he does not see that care has an exis­
tential, that is, ontological sense. Therefore, the analytic of Da-sein asks for 
Dasein's basic ontological (existential) constitution [Ve1fassungJ and does not 
wish to give a mere description of the ontic phenomena of Dasein. (Heidegger 
2001a, 1 1 6) 
As Heidegger argues here, Binswanger's account of love is not problematic 
in itself. Rather, it reveals a deeper misunderstanding that Heidegger wants 
to correct. Binswanger thought he needed to supplement care with love 
because he misunderstood care from the start. Moreover, he misunderstood 
care because he misunderstood the difference between the ontological and 
the ontic. He took care as one particular way that human beings can be ori­
ented toward their world, and wanted to show that there is another way we 
are oriented toward our world (and especially toward others) that Heidegger 
neglected. Heidegger admitted that he didn't develop a robust account of 
love, but he argued that nothing in his account of care conflicts with an 
adequate account of love. Care, taken ontologically, refers to the fact that we 
are always open to a meaningfully articulated world. Our particular mode of 
meaningful articulation-love included-can change over time, and differ 
between subjects. But that the world is meaningfully articulated through the 
existential of care is never in doubt. 
If Binswanger understood this, then he might have gone forward with his 
account of love anyway, but he would not have portrayed it as a critique of 
Heidegger's ontological account of care. Rather, he would have portrayed 
love as an ontic mode of care-one that Heidegger did not adequately articu­
late in his own work. Despite Heidegger's negative response, Binswanger 
took the criticism well and ultimately admitted his "productive misunder­
standing." However, Binswanger's misunderstanding was not as clear-cut as 
Heidegger makes it out to be. Binswanger did not simply mistake an onto­
logical phenomenon for an ontic one. Rather, his entire approach is grounded 
in an ambiguous relationship between the ontological and the ontic-even if 
Binswanger himself did not bring this ambiguity to the fore. 
In some cases, Binswanger seems to present the relationship between his 
own project and Heidegger's with the utmost clarity. For example, in his 
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essay "The Existential Analysis School of Thought," he characterizes Hei­
degger's philosophy of being-in-the-world as an "ontological thesis" about 
the "essential condition that determines existence in general" (Binswanger 
1958b, 191). Binswanger's existential analysis, in contrast, 
does not propose an ontological thesis about an essential determining existence, 
but makes antic statements-that is, statements of factual findings about actu­
ally appearing forms and configurations of existence. In this sense, existential 
analysis is an empirical science, with its own method and particular ideal of 
exactness, namely with the method and the ideal of exactness of the phenom­
enological empirical sciences. ( 1 92) 
Here, Binswanger suggests that his ontic, or empirical, project in no way 
challenges Heidegger's ontological project. 
But some of his other comments are more ambiguous. For example, he 
later says that Heidegger's account of the structure of existence provides him 
with a "norm" from which to study deviations. These deviations are, in turn, 
understood as new "forms," or even new "norms," of being-in-the-world 
(Binswanger 1958b, 201). This might suggest that he relies on Heidegger's 
ontological account of human existence as a basic starting point, a frame­
work that guides his studies of individual subjects living in concrete situa­
tions with particular psychopathological conditions. But it could also mean 
that the ontological structure itself can deviate or alter in pathological cases. 
This position would clearly pit his philosophical underpinnings against Hei­
degger's, insofar as Heidegger believes that the ontological structure itself 
cannot change or alter. 
This ambiguity is reinforced, rather than resolved, in his case studies 
and analyses. For example, when studying pathologies of temporality in 
his famous analysis of Ellen West, he says, ''temporality ... has for us an 
ontological meaning. This must always be kept in mind, even when, in the 
analysis of a specific human existence, we must limit ourselves to showing 
what anthropological metamorphoses this ontological meaning goes through" 
(Binswanger 1958a, 302). We might interpret this in a way that respects the 
boundaries of the ontological difference. When Binswanger says that the 
"ontological meaning" of temporality undergoes "anthropological metamor­
phoses," he might simply mean that at the anthropological level, the structure 
of temporality manifests through a variety of ontic modes. However, his con­
crete analyses undermine this charitable reading. Providing another example 
of temporal alterations in the case of Ellen West, he says, 
the temporalization shows the character of a shortening or shrinking of exis­
tence, that is, of the sinking of its rich and flexibly articulated ontological 
structure to a less articulated level: the unity of the structure falls apart into 
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its different ex-stasies; the ontological relation of the ex-stasies to each other 
dissolves; the ex-stasy "future" recedes more and more, the ex-stasy "past" 
predominates, and coinciding with this the present becomes the mere Now or, 
at best, a mere time-span. (Binswanger 1958a, 310) 
Here, he clearly suggests that the ontological structure of temporality has 
itself undergone some dramatic alteration. In spite of his attempts to draw a 
line between his ontic investigations of particular psychopathological cases 
and Heidegger's ontological investigations of human existence as such, this 
distinction does not hold up in his concrete investigations. This ambiguity is 
doubtless frustrating to readers seeking a clear and coherent program for the 
phenomenological study of mental disorders. But, as I show in the following 
section, this ambiguity is precisely where later French philosophers find the 
promise of a new way of understanding human existence. 
EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF FRENCH PHENOMENOLOGY 
Foucault and Merleau-Ponty found in Binswanger's existential analysis 
the seeds of a new philosophical outlook-one that actively challenges the 
distinction between the ontological and the ontic, or the transcendental and 
the empirical. Neither fully articulated the nature or implications of this chal­
lenge, but I here outline what they took to be the promise of Binswanger's 
existential analysis. 
Foucault finds in Binswanger's early work the key to a new way of con­
ceiving human existence-a way that takes us beyond the ontological dif­
ference. When Foucault was a doctoral student, he was invited to write an 
introduction to the French translation of Binswanger's 1930 essay, "Dream 
and Existence." In his introduction, he praises Binswanger's approach: 
In contemporary anthropology, the approach of Binswanger seems to us to take 
the royal road. He outflanks the problem of ontology and anthropology by going 
straight to concrete existence, to its development and its historical content. 
Thence, by way of an analysis of the structures of existence (Existenz)----of this 
very existence which bears such and such a name and has traversed such and 
such a history-he moves continually back and forth between the anthropologi­
cal forms and the ontological conditions of existence. ( 1984, 32) 
Traditionally, ontology and anthropology are distinguished in the following 
way: Ontology is the study of being; anthropology is the study of human life. 
However, when we ask what it means to be human, the bounda1y between 
the disciplines blurs. On Foucault's reading, Binswanger overcomes this 
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traditional distinction by moving between the "anthropological forms" 
(i.e., the factical modes of human existence) and the "ontological conditions" 
(i.e., the existentials, or the essential structures of human existence that make 
experience possible). 
Foucault says that Binswanger "continually crosses a dividing line that 
seems so difficult to draw, or rather, he sees it ceaselessly crossed by a 
concrete existence in which the real limit of Menschsein and Dasein is mani­
fested" (1984, 32). Therefore, 
nothing could be more mistaken than to see in Binswanger's analyses an "appli­
cation" of the concept and methods of the philosophy of existence to the "data" 
of clinical experience. It is a matter, for him, of bringing to light, by returning 
to the concrete individual, the place where the forms and conditions of existence 
articulate. Just as anthropology resists any attempt to divide it into philosophy 
and psychology, so the existential analysis of Binswanger avoids any a priori 
distinction between ontology and anthropology. One avoids the distinction with­
out eliminating it or rendering it impossible: it is relocated at the terminus of an 
inquiry whose point of departure is characterized not by a line of division, but 
by an encounter with concrete existence. (32-33) 
Importantly, Foucault does not claim that Binswanger misunderstands or 
eliminates the ontological difference-characterized here as the difference 
between ontology and the ontic science of anthropology. Rather, he claims 
that Binswanger "avoids the distinction" by placing it at the end of his study 
rather than at its beginning. But how does a study that begins from concrete 
existence avoid the distinction between ontology and anthropology? Tradi­
tionally, concrete existence stands in the domain of anthropology. The neces­
sary conditions for human experience and existence, by contrast, stand in the 
more abstract domain of ontology. But Foucault believes that Binswanger's 
distinctive approach merges these disciplines by starting from "the place 
where the forms and conditions of existence articulate."6 This ''place" can be 
nothing other than the concrete human being. Foucault seems to suggest that 
the ontological structures of human existence always inhere in a concrete sub­
ject. And if these ontological structures-these "conditions of existence"­
are made concrete, it follows that our ontological structures are susceptible to 
disturbance and disorder. 
But Foucault never spells this out for us. Following his praise for 
Binswanger's approach, he says, "[t]o be sure, this encounter [with concrete 
existence], and no less surely, the status that is finally to be assigned to the 
ontological conditions, pose problems. But we leave that issue to another 
time" (Foucault 1984, 33). Regrettably, this time never came. Foucault soon 
became disillusioned with existential analysis and turned to the poststruc­
turalism that we associate with him today. However, Foucault was not the 
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only philosopher to find the promise of a new philosophical program in 
Binswanger's existential analysis. 
fu Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty examines a number of 
psychopathological cases with the intent of revealing the shortcomings of 
traditional approaches to the study of consciousness, and he defends exis­
tential analysis as a viable alternative. He believes that the two dominant 
approaches-"empiricism" and "intellectualism"-fail to adequately account 
for the nature of psychopathological experience. According to Merleau­
Ponty, an empiricist approach assumes that consciousness is made up of 
a number of distinct parts: "If consciousness were a sum of psychic facts, 
then each disturbance should be elective"; that is, each disorder should be 
capable of altering a single structure of consciousness without disturbing the 
others (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 138). This approach fails to acknowledge how 
an alteration in one aspect of consciousness has ramifications throughout the 
entirety of consciousness. 
The intellectualist approach, on the other hand, assumes that conscious­
ness is complete and unchanging: "If consciousness were a 'representation 
function' or a pure power of signifying, then it could exist or not exist 
(and everything else along with), but it could not cease to exist after hav­
ing existed, nor could it become ill, that is, it could not be altered" (138).7 
According to Merleau-Ponty, if one presumes the necessity and invari­
ance of the structures of human existence, then "[t]he empirical variety of 
consciousness-morbid consciousness, primitive consciousness, infantile 
consciousness, the consciousness of others-cannot be known or compre­
hended. One thing alone is comprehensible, namely, the pure essence of 
consciousness. None of these other consciousnesses could fail to actualize 
the Cogito" (126-127). If one presumes necessity and invariance, then one 
sets strict constraints on how a disorder can be described and explained. 
Changes in consciousness can only occur at a relatively superficial level; 
they cannot involve alterations in our fundamental structures. Historically, 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that this has forced the philosopher or psychologist 
to devise absurd accounts of the disorder in question; such as the following: 
"Behind his delusions, obsessions, and lies, the madman knows that he is 
delirious, that he makes himself obsessive, that he lies, and ultimately that he 
is not mad, he just thinks he is" (127). According to Merleau-Ponty, the very 
idea of genuine madness is made incoherent by the metaphysical presump­
tion of essential structures. 
Merleau-Ponty embraces existential analysis as a way to coherently 
understand psychopathological existence: "The study of a pathological case 
has thus allowed us to catch sight of a new mode of analysis-existential 
analysis-that goes beyond the classical alternatives between empiri­
cism and intellectualism, or between explanation and reflection" (138). 
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What Merleau-Ponty finds in Binswanger's existential analysis is an approach 
that acknowledges both the holistic nature of consciousness and its deep con­
tingency. For him, it acknowledges that the human being constitutes her lived, 
meaningful world. But it also admits that the world itself-our life events, or 
personal experiences, our history and circumstances-reshapes us at a funda­
mental level. However, just how fundamental this level is is left ambiguous 
in Merleau-Ponty's writings. Like Binswanger, Merleau-Ponty sometimes 
makes strong claims that seem to undermine the necessity and invariance of 
our ontological or transcendental structures. But, in his case studies, he often 
fails to distinguish between those disorders that do not involve alterations in 
our basic existential structures, and those that can be made sense of only if 
these basic structures are contingent and variable. 
BEYOND THE ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE 
In light of its challenge to the ontological difference, Foucault and Merleau­
Ponty found immense promise in Binswanger's existential analysis. But they 
did not adequately articulate what it means to overcome this difference and 
thereby failed to adequately articulate the philosophical foundations for the 
study of human existence. In light of this, I here develop an account of what 
it means to overcome the ontological difference and show how this account 
opens up a space for phenomenologists to study psychopathological existence. 
Remember that Heidegger makes a distinction between the essential struc­
tures of human existence, which he calls existentials, and the non-essential 
ways that these existentials manifest, which he calls modes. Each existential 
is an ontological category, and this category encompasses a diverse array of 
ontic modes. It is the category, or categorial structure of human existence, 
that is essential-not the diverse modes that it encompasses.8 
This helps us understand the ontological difference. But how does it help 
us understand what it means to go beyond the ontological difference? If any­
thing, it seems that this way of drawing the distinction makes the difference 
abundantly clear: Ontological categories are different from the ontic phenom­
ena that they encompass. What could it mean to overcome this difference-to 
complicate or blur this boundary? 
To overcome the ontological difference, we would have to show that the 
features of ontological existentials and the features of ontic modes do not 
differ as much as Heidegger believed. But what are these distinguishing fea­
tures? Existentials are necessary and categorial; modes, on the other hand, are 
contingent and particular. Now, we're hardly going to show that existentials 
aren't categorial, but we might show that they are contingent-rather than 
necessary and invariant-features of human existence. 
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I'll begin with an example of a contingent existential in a psychopathologi­
cal condition, and then articulate its implications for overcoming the onto­
logical difference. Depression is often characterized as a distinctive mood, or 
feeling. The depressed person may feel sad, hopeless, or guilty, and this feel­
ing shapes how he experiences and understands his world. On a Heideggerian 
reading, then, depression is a modal disorder-it consists in a particular mode 
of human existence that discloses the world in a distressing or pathological 
way. In this case, the basic structure of human existence remains unchanged. 
The depressed person is still affectively situated in the world, which means 
that he or she retains the existential of situatedness. 
A phenomenologist who holds Heideggerian commitments to the ontologi­
cal difference would argue that all psychopathological conditions should be 
understood in this way. Through our ontological investigations, we discover 
"essential structures" that hold for all factical subjects. Therefore, any altera­
tions in human experience and existence can involve only changes in non­
essential features, such as the ontic modes of human existence. This outlook 
clearly accommodates the cases of depression mentioned earlier and might 
accommodate a wide range of other psychopathological conditions, such as 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and personality disorders. 
But let's consider some more severe disorders, such as melancholic depres­
sion and schizophrenia, to see how well they mesh with these philosophical 
assumptions. 
In severe forms of depression, including cases diagnosed as melancholic 
depression, many people report a general loss of feeling, rather than a kind 
of feeling. In fact, despite a general association of depression with feel­
ings of sadness, despair, and grief, many people diagnosed with depression 
report an inability to have these feelings-at least to any significant degree. 
Chase Twichell, for example, recounts one of her childhood experiences of 
depression: 
I'm about eight, reading in bed when my mother comes in to tell me that my 
dog, hit by a car the day before, had died at the vet's. I put my face in my hands, 
a self-conscious and exaggerated expression of sorrow. My first impulse is to 
act the part of a grieving child. I am a grieving child, of course, but the real 
grief is inaccessible to me at that moment. In its place is a calm, numb kind of 
consciousness, out of which I can fake the expected responses. (200 1 ,  22) 
Andrew Solomon reports a similar experience: 
The first thing that goes is happiness. You cannot gain pleasure from anything. 
That's famously the cardinal symptom of major depression. But soon other emo­
tions follow happiness into oblivion: sadness as you know it, the sadness that 
seemed to have led you here; your sense of humor; your belief in and capacity 
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for love. Your mind is leached until you seem dim-witted even to yourself . . . .  
You lose the ability to trust anyone, to be touched, to grieve. Eventually, you 
are simply absent from yourself. (2001 ,  1 9) 
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How would a Heideggerian phenomenologist account for such experiences? 
Which changes in subjectivity would she appeal to in order to make sense 
of an inability to grieve, to feel, to be affectively touched by the world? If 
she remains committed to Heidegger's belief that situatedness is an essential 
structure for human existence, then she would have to redescribe the loss of 
feeling as a feeling of not feeling. That is, rather than taking reports of not 
feeling at face value, the Heideggerian phenomenologists would explain 
these reports away by saying that when someone reports a loss of feeling, he 
is actually reporting a peculiar feeling of things not mattering, or not having 
value. Such a feeling might be possible, but the phenomenological psychopa­
thologist should not confine herself to such an account in advance. 
If we put our essentialist assumptions aside, and allow for alterations in 
the ontological structures themselves, then what kind of account would we 
be able to offer? How would a phenomenologist make sense of a genuine 
loss of feeling, without redescribing it as a feeling of not feeling? Some 
phenomenologists already provide these alternative accounts of depression, 
although they don't necessarily characterize their accounts as overcoming or 
challenging the metaphysical presuppositions of the ontological difference. 
Thomas Fuchs, for instance, argues that melancholic depression involves 
a loss of bodily resonance-one's lived body loses its affective attunement 
to others and the world (Fuchs 2013). I, on the other hand, argue that 
some people diagnosed with severe depression are de-situated-that is, the 
depressed person loses the capacity to be affectivity situated in and attuned 
to her world (Fernandez 2014a, 2014b). For our purposes, we don't need to 
distinguish these views. Both appeal to a general degradation in our ability 
to be affectively situated in and attuned to our world. And, therefore, both 
suggest an ontological change in human existence. If one is not affectively 
situated at all, then we might argue that the ontological category-the exis­
tential of situatedness-is lost. An entire category of experiential phenomena 
has been annihilated from the subject's world. Alternatively, if we allow only 
for partially diminished affective situatedness, then we might argue that the 
category itself has been constrained, or altered. The entire category of aff ec­
tive phenomena is less intense. 
Alfred Kraus also characterizes melancholic depression as a loss of moods 
and feelings: "At its core, the melancholic mood alteration is-paradoxically 
formulated-rather a lack of mood" (Kraus 2003, 208). However, he also 
points out that this lack of mood can involve a loss of ipseity, or selfb.ood. 
Typically, moods situate us in a world. As Heidegger says, we always find
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ourselves through a mood, or affective attunement. But, in a melancholic 
episode, moods are lost, and melancholic depersonalization sets in. The sub­
ject feels strangely distinct from himself, as if he cannot be himself. This is 
different from feeling that he hasn't lived up to his own expectations, or that 
his character or values have changed over time. The sense of selfhood that is 
lost in cases of depersonalization is, rather, a condition for having these kinds 
of experiences. 
In both the loss of mood and the loss of ipseity we find an ontological 
alteration-a change in the existential itself-rather than a change from one 
ontic mode to another. This kind of deep ontological alteration likely occurs 
in other conditions as well, such as bipolar disorder (Fernandez 2014b), 
schizophrenia, and some neurological disorders. The phenomenological 
literature on schizophrenia, for instance, focuses on another disturbance 
of ipseity. As Louis Sass and Josef Pamas explain, positive symptoms of 
schizophrenia are "defined by a kind of diminished self-affection-that is, 
by a loss of the sense of inhabiting one's own actions, thoughts, feelings, 
impulses, bodily sensations, or perceptions, often to the point of feeling that 
these are actually in the possession or under the control of some alien force. 
Along with this diminishment, the very distinction between self and other 
may disappear" (Sass and Pamas 2003, 431). We might characterize this as 
a crisis of identity, but it's of a fundamentally different sort from the kind of 
crisis one might undergo when leaving behind a career, immigrating to a new 
country, or revealing one's sexual orientation. In these cases, one can only 
have a crisis of identity because there is a distinct sense of self and other-I 
left my career, I immigrated, I revealed my sexual orientation. In the case 
of schizophrenia, by contrast, this distinction between self and other breaks 
down, producing bizarre experiences of alien control. 
What we find in these cases are alterations in the ontological structures 
themselves. In some cases, an entire ontological category of phenomena might 
be lost. In other cases, the ontological category remains, but all of its ontic 
modes are altered. All of one's moods, for instance, might have diminished 
intensity. Or one's ability to distinguish one's own identity and agency from 
those of others might be compromised. Notably, these alterations can show up 
to us as distinctly ontological only if we have already distinguished ontologi­
cal existentials from their ontic modes. Without this distinction, we wouldn't 
be able to know when an alteration is truly ontological, or simply ontic. When 
we fail to draw this distinction, we end up with the ambiguities that we find in 
Binswanger's existential analysis, as well as Foucault's and Merleau-Ponty's 
adoptions of this program. These philosophers offer provocative, but ulti­
mately ambiguous, characterizations of psychopathological conditions. 
In order to establish a sound foundation for phenomenological psychopa­
thology, we first have to determine what kind of alteration has occurred in the 
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condition in question. And we can determine this only by (a) distinguishing 
the ontological from the ontic and (b) admitting a deep contingency in the 
ontological structures themselves. If we haven't distinguished the ontologi­
cal from the ontic, then we can't determine at what level an alteration has 
occurred. And, if we haven't admitted contingency in the ontological struc­
tures, then we will look for alterations only at the ontic level. To admit con­
tingency in the ontological structures is, in a sense, to particularize them-to 
admit that they are always instantiated in a concrete human existence and are 
therefore susceptible to disturbance and disorder. This admission moves us 
beyond the ontological difference, beyond the distinction between the ontic 
human being and the ontological structure of human existence in general. To 
properly understand psychopathological existence, we have to admit that our 
questions about the particular human being might, at the same time, be ques­
tions about what it means to be human. 
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NOTES 
1. Foucault is typically characterized as a post-structuralist, rather than as a 
phenomenologist. However, as I discuss later, Foucault's early work owes much to 
Binswanger's existential analysis, which is broadly phenomenological in scope and ori­
entation. For more on the relation between Binswanger and Foucault, see Smyth (2011 ). 
2. In Heidegger scholarship, it is common to stress the distinction between "exis­
tentials" and "categories." On Heidegger's account, existentials apply to human exis­
tence, and categories apply to nonhuman entities, whether they be physical objects, 
social events, or even ideas. However, the refusal to refer to existentials as "catego­
ries," or "categorial structures," is based on a misunderstanding of Heidegger's dis­
tinction. Heidegger doesn't want to confuse existentials with Aristotelian categories, 
but this doesn't mean that existentials aren't ontological categories or don't function 
as categories. In fact, throughout his early lectures, Heidegger often referred to the 
"categorial structures" and "categorial determinants" of human existence (Fernandez 
2017; Heidegger 2005, 2008). 
3. This existential is unique, insofar as it includes three existentials within it: situ­
atedness (Befindlichkeit), understanding (Verstehen), and discourse (Rede). However, 
for our purposes, we can set this feature of care aside. 
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4. Richard Askay' s  afterword (200 1) to the Zollikon Seminars provides a detailed 
analysis of Heidegger' s  criticisms. According to Askay, Heidegger leveled five 
critiques against Binswanger's project. However, I take it that all of these critiques 
stem from Binswanger's failure to fully understand and acknowledge the ontological 
difference, so I do not distinguish among these critiques here. 
5. For a work that addresses Heidegger' s, Binswanger's, and Boss's approaches 
to the study of mental disorders, see Kouba (2015). 
6. The wording in this sentence is Wlclear, but I take it that Foucault means that 
the "forms" and "conditions" of human existence are only ever articulated in a con­
crete human being. 
7. It is important to note that Heidegger's philosophy does not fit neatly under the 
label of "intellectualism." Some of Merleau-Ponty's critiques of intellectualism are 
even Heideggerian in character. However, one aspect of this critique-the critique of 
essentialism, or the belief in necessary and invariant structures of human existence­
can be leveled against the philosophical presuppositions of Heidegger's Being and Time. 
8. It might be tempting to argue that at least some modes are essential. Take, for 
example, the centrality of the mode of anxiety (Angst) in Heidegger' s  philosophy. 
Maybe all human beings are open to the possibility of anxiety. Maybe all human 
beings even experience anxiety at some point in their lives. This still doesn't make 
anxiety "essential" in Heidegger's sense. Heidegger says that he aims to uncover 
essential structures that persist "in every kind of Being that factical Dasein may pos­
sess" (Heidegger 1962, 38). Therefore, when Heidegger calls something "essential," 
he means that it holds in all cases. Affective situatedness is essential because we are 
always affectively situated. Temporality is essential because we are always tempo­
rally open to the world. But, we are not always in the mode of anxiety, in the same 
way that we are not always in the temporal mode of eager anticipation. Modes, on 
Heidegger's account, are not essential. 
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